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It is estimated that the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) contained in the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) will be incorporated in almost one thousand
one hundred tax treaties. There is no doubt that this test will have wide ramifications for structuring activities that are carried out with tax treaties.
In this contribution the author undertakes a detailed analysis of the test. Firstly, the author discusses the background to the PPT. Secondly, the author
analyses various elements of the test and provides guidance on interpreting its subjective and objective elements. Thirdly, the author critically comments
and expresses his opinion on all the nineteen examples that have been provided in the commentary in relation to the test. In this regard, it is pertinent to
note that several of these examples seem to be inspired from Court judgments on the ‘beneficial ownership’ clause and the Exchange of Letters with respect
to the anti-conduit rule contained in the US-UK tax treaty. Fourthly, the author analyses the legal consequences of denying treaty benefits in relation
to rule and treaty shopping schemes by focussing on the discretionary relief clause. Finally, the author concludes and provides certain recommendations to
intermediary entities such as holding, financing and intellectual property (IP) entities. It is pertinent to note that the author will analyse the
relationship between the PPT (as well as the guiding principle) and other anti-avoidance rules, treaty and domestic, in a subsequent contribution.
1 INTRODUCTION
1. The OECD released the Multilateral Convention
to swiftly implement the various tax treaty related Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) measures
(Multilateral Instrument or MLI)1 and its Explanatory
Statement2 in November 2016. The MLI3 contains the
text of the various tax treaty related changes that were
proposed by Action 2 (hybrid mismatches),4 Action 6
(treaty abuse),5 Action 7 (artificial avoidance of the PE
status)6 and Action 14 (improving dispute resolution)7
of the BEPS Plan whereas the Explanatory Statement
clarifies the text of the Convention.8
2. With respect to countering treaty abuse, Action
6 of the BEPS Plan had recommended a minimum
standard that States could adopt into their tax treaty
network.9 Specifically, it was suggested that States
should, firstly, change the preamble of the tax
treaties.10 In this regard, Article 6(1) of the MLI
provides that the preamble of the Covered Tax
Agreement (CTA) shall be modified. This change
ensures that the purpose of tax treaties, in addition
to eliminating double taxation, is not to create
opportunities for tax evasion or tax avoidance (espe-
cially, treaty-shopping arrangements).11
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1 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention.
2 2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention.
3 For an analysis of the structure and functioning of the MLI and/or its provisions see for instance: Bosman, MLI; Danon, Salome, MLI; Baker, MLI; Hattingh, MLI; and Butani,
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4 2015 OECD, Final Report on Hybrid Mismatches.
5 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse.
6 2015 OECD, Final Report on Permanent Establishments.
7 2015 OECD, Final Report on Dispute Resolution.
8 2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 11.
9 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, paras 22–23.
10 Ibid. paras 72–74.
11 See 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 6(1). Also see 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, paras 72–74. Also see 2017 OECD Model (draft), Title and
Preamble.
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3. Secondly, in addition to changing the preamble,
States were required to add to their tax treaties either:
(1) the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) only12 (Article 7
(1) of the MLI);
(2) the PPT and the limitation of benefit (LOB) clause13
(the simplified version,14 which is reflected in
Article 7(8)–Article 7(13) of the MLI);
(3) Detailed LOB clause and anti-abuse measures to
counteract conduit financing.15 The anti-abuse mea-
sures could stem from domestic law (such as the US
conduit financing rules16) or could be treaty based
(such as the anti-conduit rule contained in Article 3
(1)(n) of the 2001 US-UK tax treaty17).
4. In order to meet this minimum standard,
seventy-one signatory countries to the MLI (as on
17 August 2017)18 have adopted the revised pream-
ble and the PPT.19 A few States, in addition to the
revised preamble and the PPT, have also made their
choice to opt for the simplified LOB clause with
respect to their CTAs.20
5. The purpose of this article is to analyse the PPT
contained in the MLI as it is estimated that this rule
will be incorporated in more than 1,100 treaties.21
Specifically, the author discusses the background to
the test i.e. the guiding principle (see section 2);
analyses the various elements of the test (see section 3);
critically comments on the various examples that
have been proposed in relation to the test (see sec-
tion 4); analyses the legal consequences of denying
treaty benefits in rule and treaty shopping situations,
especially, in light of the discretionary relief clause
(see section 5), concludes by summarizing his analysis
(see section 6) and by providing recommendations to
intermediary entities (see section 7). It is pertinent to
note that the author will analyse the relationship
between the PPT (as well as the guiding principle)
and other anti-avoidance rules, treaty and domestic,
in a subsequent contribution.
2 EVOLUTION OF THE TEST: THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLE
6. The OECD Commentary22 states that tax treaty
benefits need not be granted to a taxpayer when that
Notes
12 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26; 2017 OECD Model (draft), Art. 29(9).
13 2017 OECD Model (draft), Art. 29(1)–Art. 29(7).
14 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 25 (Commentary in para. 2); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 2.
15 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 25 (Commentary in para. 3); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 3.
16 In US tax law sphere, the use of intermediary conduit entities is counteracted by specific conduit financing regulations. These rules, which were introduced in 1993, target
foreign taxpayers that use intermediary entities to obtain reduced withholding taxes available pursuant to US tax treaties. The rules are triggered when (1) there is a
‘financing arrangement’ wherein two or more financing transactions are linked by an intermediary entity; (2) the participation of the intermediary entity reduces the tax
imposed under the US tax law provisions; (3) the participation of the intermediary entity is pursuant to a tax avoidance plan; and (4) the intermediary entity is related to the
borrower or lender or unrelated but ‘would not have participated in the financing arrangement on substantially the same terms but for the fact that the financing entity has engaged in the
financing transaction with the intermediary entity’. If the rules are triggered then the US tax authorities have the power to re-characterize financing transactions made through an
intermediate, as direct financing transactions. See s. 881, US IRC read in conjunction with US Treasury regulations, 1.881–3; Brauner, Beneficial Ownership, at 159–160;
Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 212–218.
17 The provision provides that the term ‘conduit arrangement means a transaction or series of transactions: (i) which is structured in such a way that a resident of a Contracting State entitled
to the benefits of this Convention receives an item of income arising in the other Contracting State but that resident pays, directly or indirectly, all or substantially all of that income (at any time
or in any form) to another person who is not a resident of either Contracting State and who, if it received that item of income direct from the other Contracting State, would not be entitled under a
convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the state in which that other person is resident and the Contracting State in which the income arises, or otherwise, to benefits with respect to
that item of income which are equivalent to, or more favourable than, those available under this Convention to a resident of a Contracting State; and (ii) which has as its main purpose, or one of
its main purposes, obtaining such increased benefits as are available under this Convention’. See Art. 3(1)(n), UK-US Tax Treaty (2001). The provision provides for an objective and
motive test. Similar provision is found in Art. 3(1)(L), UK-Swiss Tax Treaty (1977 as amended by the 2009 protocol). In its 2014 report on treaty abuse, the OECD had
recommended States to adopt such provisions in their tax treaty network. See 2014 OECD, Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 17 (Commentary in para. 15). However, this
provision was not reflected in its final report on treaty abuse as issues were identified with respect to the phrase ‘all or substantially all of that income’. See Ringler, Beneficial
Ownership, at 348–350.
18 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf.
19 The following countries have adopted the PPT as a minimum standard: Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Korea, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, San Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Cameroon and Nigeria.
Moreover, the following countries have opted to apply the PPT as an interim measure which means that, in the near future, these States may either adopt
the LOB clause as a replacement or in addition to the PPT: Canada, Chile, Colombia, Kuwait, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles and Mauritius.
20 See the positions adopted by Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Slovak Republic and Uruguay.
21 See MLI, Information Brochure, https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-instrument-BEPS-tax-treaty-information-brochure.pdf.
22 The extent to which the OECD Commentary can be used in the interpretation of tax treaties has been the subject matter of extensive debate and there seems to be no
consensus regarding its legal status. Specifically, the issue arises as regards the relationship between the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention (VCLT) and the OECD
Commentary i.e. is the practice of considering the OECD Commentary permitted by the rules of the VCLT? In the author’s view, the attempt to classify the OECD
Commentary under one provision or another of the VCLT is not a gainful exercise. This is because the interpretation provisions contained in the VCLT are a ‘means to an end
and not as an end in themselves’. The draft Commentary to the VCLT makes this clear and states that the drafters, in drafting the interpretation rules of the VCLT, never
intended Art. 31 and Art. 32 of the VCLT to be a complete codification of all principles and maxims that has to be adopted in interpreting treaties. Therefore, even if the
OECD Commentary cannot be considered to fit in Art. 31 and Art. 32 VCLT – it is submitted that it should be considered relevant in the tax treaty interpretation process
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taxpayer’s arrangement or transaction is abusive.
Towards this end, the 2003 OECD Commentary,
in paragraph 9.5, provides for a ‘guiding principle’23
which can be used to determine if abuse exists or
does not exist. Abuse arises when:
(1) a main purpose for entering into a transaction or
arrangement was to secure a more favourable tax
position (subjective element); and
(2) obtaining that more favourable tax position would
be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant
tax treaty provisions (objective element).
7. These elements are also found in judicial doc-
trines and domestic statutory General Anti-
Avoidance Rules (GAARs) of several States.24 In
light of these similarities, in the author’s opinion,
the guiding principle can be regarded as a treaty
GAAR.25 This is confirmed by the report on BEPS
Action 626 and the 2017 draft OECD commentary.27
Accordingly, if the relevant tax treaty does not incor-
porate the PPT, the guiding principle could be
applied to deny treaty benefits. Of course, denial of
treaty benefits will depend on whether or not all the
elements of the principle are satisfied. Further, the
author’s opinion is that the guiding principle can be
applied to a tax treaty that has been concluded only
after January 200328 (as it was introduced only in
that year). Moreover, the principle can be applied
only to fact patterns that are not caught by other
treaty anti-avoidance rules.29 This being said, the
author states that Courts, even though they have
referred to the 2003 OECD Commentary in abusive
cases,30 have not discussed or commented on the
guiding principle till date.
3 THE PPT AND AN ANALYSIS OF ITS
ELEMENTS
3.1 Preliminary Remarks
8. The elements contained in the guiding principle
are also reflected in the PPT. In fact the PPT is built
on the guiding principle.31 Article 7(1) of the MLI32
provides that:
Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement,
a) a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be
granted in respect of an item of income or capital (the
presence of a benefit)
b) if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant
facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one
of the principal purposes33 of any arrangement or transaction
that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit (subjec-
tive element)
c) unless it is established that granting that benefit in these
circumstances would be in accordance with the object and
Notes
because Art. 31 and Art. 32 VCLT ‘were never intended to be exhaustive either in the description of materials that could be examined by, or the principles of interpretation that could be
followed’ in interpretation of an international treaty. Therefore, the author’s position is that the OECD Commentary, existing at the time of conclusion of a tax treaty, is not a
legally binding instrument but nevertheless plays an important role in the tax treaty interpretation process. Moreover, the author states that subsequent versions of the
OECD Commentary can be considered, only if, the revised Commentary is in the nature of a clarification. Consequently, if the revised Commentary represents a fundamental
change or if the Commentary reverses or contradicts previous versions then that Commentary should be disregarded and should not be taken into the tax treaty interpretation
process. See Chand, Thesis, Ch. 6.
23 2003 OECD Comm. Art. 1, para. 9.5; 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 59 (Commentary in para. 14); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 61.
24 See Chand, Thesis, Ch. 3. In this chapter, the author provides a comparative overview of the judicial doctrines, statutory GAARs or SAARs that are applied by the source or
residence States to counteract cross-border tax avoidance schemes.
25 See Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3; Arnold & Van Weeghel, Abuse, at 93; Arnold, 2003 changes, at 250. The author does not agree with the position that the guiding principle acts as
a restriction to the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules (that are used to counter treaty abuse) as those rules, in general, conflict with tax treaties and hence should
not be applied. See Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3. Moreover, the guiding principle cannot act as a restriction to the inherent anti-abuse rule doctrine as that rule does not exist. See
Chand, Thesis, s. 21.3.1.1. These issues will be discussed in a subsequent contribution by the author in the same journal.
26 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 59 (Commentary in para. 14).
27 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 1, para. 61; 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 169.
28 See Chand, Thesis, s. 9.1.
29 See Chand, Thesis, s. 21.3.3. The relationship between the guiding principle and treaty anti-avoidance rules will be discussed in a subsequent contribution by the author in
the same journal.
30 For instance, see the decision of the Swiss Supreme Court in A Holding ApS v. Federal Tax Administration, 8 ITLR 536, 28 Nov. 2005, at 536–562.
31 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 1); See De Broe, EU Law, at 209.
32 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(1).
33 Similar language is used in EU Direct Tax Directives. For instance, Art. 11(1)(a) of the Merger Directive (MD) provides that the benefits of the directive are not available when the
transaction (merger, division, transfer of assets or exchange of shares) ‘has as its principal objective or as one of its principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance’. See EUMD, Directive 90/
434/EEC, Art. 11(a). Likewise, Art. 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (PSD), as amended in Jan. 2015, provides that ‘Member States shall not grant the benefits of this Directive to an
arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are
not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances’. See EU PSD, Directive 2015/121, Art. 1(2). Moreover, the recent EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive proposes Member
States to incorporate a GAAR in their domestic law vis-à-vis corporate taxation. Art. 6(1) of the directive states ‘For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a Member State
shall ignore an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the
applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part’. See EU ATAD, Directive 2016/1164, Art. 6(1).
Moreover, see fn. 61 (infra).
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purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement (objective element).
9. Article 7(2),34 the compatibility clause, provides
that such a provision shall be included ‘in place of or in
the absence of’35 similar provisions of all CTAs.
However, pursuant to Article 7(15),36 the reservation
clause, a Party may opt out from the application of
the PPT rule when (1) that Party, pursuant to Article
7(15)(a), intends to meet the minimum standard by
adopting a detailed LOB provision and either rules to
address conduit financing or a PPT rule through
bilateral discussions with its treaty partner; or (2)
when the CTA, pursuant to Article 7(15)(b), already
contains a rule similar to the PPT rule.37
3.2 Burden of Proof
10. There is no doubt that the burden of proof38 of
the PPT is unbalanced and unreasonable39 in compar-
ison to the guiding principle.40 Even though the tax
authorities will be required to undertake an objective
analysis of the facts of the transaction they only have to
‘reasonably’41 (and not convincingly) conclude that the
subjective element is satisfied.42 This threshold seems
to be low in comparison to the burden assumed by the
taxpayer wherein it is required to ‘establish’ (convin-
cingly) that granting the benefit is in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the
tax treaty (objective element).43 This would typically
be the case in regular tax assessments.
11. The existence of a benefit (see section 3.3) and
proving that one of the principal purposes of the
arrangement is to secure that benefit (see section 3.4)
requires an objective factual analysis. If the case goes
for litigation before the Courts, as a starting point the
tax authorities will have to prove that a tax benefit
exists and a principal purpose of the transaction/
arrangement was to obtain that benefit. The taxpayer
should then be given an opportunity to refute or
challenge the tax authorities claims by disputing the
existence of a benefit or showing that the transaction
was driven by non-tax purposes. When the Court
reasonably concludes that the benefit is available and
the subjective element is satisfied, the taxpayer should
be given the opportunity to demonstrate that he
acts in accordance with the objective element
(see section 3.5). The tax authorities should then be
given an opportunity to refute or challenge the tax-
payer’s claims. In the end, based on an objective
analysis of the facts, the Court will have to decide
whether or not the transaction/arrangement satisfied
the PPT. If the existence of ‘abuse’, ‘tax avoidance’ or
‘artificial nature of the arrangement’ is not clear to the
Court, then the benefit of the doubt, in the author’s
opinion, shall go to the taxpayer.44
3.3 Benefit Under the Tax Treaty with
Respect to an Arrangement or
Transaction
12. The PPT provides that a ‘benefit’, with respect
to an ‘arrangement’/‘transaction’,45 under the tax
treaty, whether available directly or indirectly,46
should not be given if the subjective and objective
Notes
34 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(2).
35 This implies that the provision will apply in all cases. See 2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 15.
36 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(15).
37 2016 OECD, Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention, para. 85.
38 There is scholarly discussion that the burden of proof is disproportionate from an EU Law perspective. See De Broe, EU Law, at 238–239.
39 De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 132; De Broe, EU Law, at 216; Lang, PPT rule, at 660; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.5.
40 With respect to the guiding principle, the author submits that the tax authorities assume the burden of proof and they have to prove that the transaction undertaken by the
taxpayer satisfies the subjective and objective elements. De Broe, Thesis, at 319; De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 132; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.5.
41 There is scholarly discussion on whether or not the PPT and, in particular, the reasonableness requirement conflicts with the principle of legal certainty in EU Law. See De
Broe, EU Law, at 239; Weber, PPT, s. 5; Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.5.4.1.
42
De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 132; Lang, PPT rule, at 659; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.5.
43 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 2); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 170; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.5.
44 See the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court to interpret the Canadian GAAR in Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, 2005 SCC 54, 19 Oct. 2005, para. 30; Chand,
Thesis, s. 9.3.5.
45 The terms ‘arrangement’ or ‘transaction’, are to be interpreted broadly. They include ‘any agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction or series of transactions, whether or not they are
legally enforceable’. Specifically, they include ‘transactions’ or ‘arrangements’ with respect to (1) the creation, assignment, acquisition or transfer of the income or of the property
or right in respect of which the income arises; and (2) the establishment, acquisition or maintenance of a person who derives the income, including the establishment of that
person as a resident of one of the Contracting States. See 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 9); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29,
para. 177. These broad definitions set a low threshold for considering the possible application of the PPT. Moreover, in order to understand, the terms ‘series of transactions’ see
Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, paras 23–26; Moreover, see the discussion on the step transaction doctrine applied in the US and UK. See Chand, Thesis, s. 3.2.3.
46 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 8); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 176.
The Principal Purpose Test in the Multilateral Convention
21
elements are satisfied.47 The commentary to the PPT
states that the term ‘benefit’ includes ‘all limitations… on
taxation imposed on the State of source under Articles 6
through 22 of the Convention, the relief from double taxation
provided by Article 23, and the protection afforded to residents
and nationals of a Contracting State under Article 24 or any
other similar limitations’.48 The issue arises as to whether
a procedural benefit available to a taxpayer, such as
access to a MAP or arbitration under Article 25 of the
OECD Model, can be denied under the PPT? In the
author’s opinion, this should not be the case since such
a benefit cannot be considered as ‘any other similar
limitations’ as provided in the commentary to this rule.-
49 Furthermore, it should be noted that the term
‘benefit’ does not include the treaties scope (Articles
1–2 of the OECD Model) and definitional provisions
(Articles 3–5 of the OECD Model). Arguably, these
provisions by themselves do not give any benefits and
therefore should be read in conjunction with the other
operative provisions.50 Moreover, the author states that
only benefits covered under the relevant tax treaty will
fall within the scope of the PPT. Benefits arising to a
taxpayer under the domestic law (direct or indirect tax
related benefits) or another tax treaty or EU Law will
not fall under the scope of this test.51
3.4 The Subjective Element
3.4.1 Introductory Comments
13. Treaty benefits will be denied under the PPT if
it is reasonably concluded that ‘one of the principal
purposes’52 for entering into the transaction/arrange-
ment was to obtain a tax benefit. It is obvious that
the taxpayer cannot avoid the application of this
element by simply stating that the ‘arrangement or
transaction was not undertaken or arranged to obtain the
benefits of the Convention’.53 Likewise, the tax autho-
rities cannot uphold the application of this element
by comparing the actual transaction with an alter-
native transaction that might have resulted in higher
taxes.54 Therefore, in order to determine the ‘purposes’
for entering into the arrangement or transaction, an
objective analysis of all facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction/arrangement needs to be
carried out.55
3.4.2 Factual Analysis Indicates that Sole Purpose
of the Transaction or Arrangement
Is to Obtain Tax Benefits
14. If an objective analysis of all facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction/arrangement
leads to the conclusion that the principal purpose
(or the main purpose or the dominant purpose or the
sole purpose or the essential aim) of the transaction/
arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit, then there is
no doubt that the subjective element should be
satisfied56 (refer to the fact patterns in section 4.2).
Even if this is the case, the taxpayer has the oppor-
tunity to establish that the benefit is in accordance
with the ‘object and purpose of the relevant provisions of
the Covered Tax Agreement’ (see section 3.5).
Notes
47 Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, paras 18–20.
48 2014 OECD, Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 17 (Commentary in para. 7); 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 7); 2017 OECD
Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 175; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.2.
49 Lang, PPT rule, at 657; De Broe, EU Law, at 218–221.
50 De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 131; Lang, PPT rule, at 657; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.2.
51 Lang, PPT rule, at 656; De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 131; De Broe, EU Law, at 210; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.2.
52 Commentators contend that the subjective element could conflict with the proportionality principle in EU Law. This is because ECJ case law uses a higher threshold to
determine the existence of abuse i.e. abuse arises only when the essential aim or sole aim or sole purpose of the transaction/arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit. See De Broe,
EU Law, at 237–238; Moreover, see the Opinion Of Advocate General Bobek in Cussens and others, Case No: C-251/16, 7 Sept. 2017, para. 97. A commentator discusses
whether this phrase is to be interpreted on a pure subjective basis (intention or motive of the taxpayer) or by taking into consideration its objective content (purpose of the
arrangement). See Moreno, PPT, at 436–440. In my opinion, the subjective element represents an objective analysis test.
53 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 11); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 179; Also see Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v.
Canada, para. 29; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.3.
54 Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, para. 30; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.3.
55 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 10); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 178.
56 Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.3. In fact, the ECJ case law reaches a similar conclusion in the context of interpreting EU directives. In the context of the VAT directive, the ECJ has
held that abuse arises when firstly ‘the transaction concerned … result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions’ (objective
test) and secondly ‘it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage’ (subjective test). See ECJ:
Halifax plc and others v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, Case No: C-255/02, 21 Feb. 2006, paras 74–75; In the context of interpreting Art. 11(a) of the Merger Directive, the
ECJ in the Kofoed case has held that abuse arises when transactions are carried out ‘solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by Community law’. See ECJ:
Hans Markus Kofoed v. Skatteministeriet, Case No: C-321/05, 5 July 2007, para. 38. Moreover, in the Foggia case, it was held that ‘The application of EU legislation may not be
extended to cover abusive practices, that is to say, transactions carried out … but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for by that law.’ See Foggia – Sociedade
Gestora de Participações Sociais SA v. Secretário de Estado dos Assuntos Fiscais, Case No: C-126/10, 10 Nov. 2011, para. 50; Justice Campbell also uses the term ‘the sole purpose’ to
interpret the subjective (avoidance transaction) element of the Canadian GAAR. See Antle v. R; Marquis-Antle Spousal Trust v. R; Antle and another v. R, 12 ITLR 359, 18 Sept.
2009, para. 80; Also see the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Cussens and others, Case No: C-251/16, 7 Sept. 2017, paras 100–101; Dourado, Abuse, at 54–56.
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3.4.3 Factual Analysis Indicates that the Transaction
or Arrangement has Non-Tax and Tax
Purposes
15. If an objective analysis of all facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction/arrange-
ment leads to the conclusion that there are several
‘principal purposes’, such as non-tax purposes57 and
tax purposes, then the question arises as to whether
the subjective element is satisfied or not? Based on
a literal reading of the test, it can be argued that as
long as ‘one of the principal purposes’ is to obtain a tax
benefit, even if the transaction/arrangement has
several ‘principal purposes’, the subjective element
gets satisfied.58 Therefore, at first sight, it seems
that tax authorities have tremendous discretion
when applying this rule.59 This being said, in the
author’s opinion, if the proper factual inquiry leads
to the conclusion that ‘non tax purposes’ outweigh
‘tax purposes’, then the taxpayer does not satisfy the
subjective element and hence should be outside the
scope of the PPT. The commentary to the PPT
explicitly clarifies this position by stating that
the subjective element is not applicable when a
principal consideration is not to obtain a treaty
benefit. It is stated, ‘Where an arrangement is inex-
tricably linked to a core commercial activity, and its form
has not been driven by considerations of obtaining a
benefit, it is unlikely that its principal purpose will be
considered to be to obtain that benefit.’60 This clarifica-
tion has also been reflected in several examples of
the PPT. For instance, refer to the fact patterns
that deal with:
(1) Investments by a collective investment vehicle (CIV)
and direct investment to create a plant (see section
4.3.1);
(2) investments by intermediary companies that are
owned by third State residents such as entities
within a multinational group like operating entities
(see sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2), entities holding
share and patents (see section 4.3.2.3), service entities
(see section 4.3.2.4), financing entities (see section
4.3.2.5) and intellectual property licensing entities
(see section 4.3.2.6);
(3) investments by intermediary companies that are
owned/set up by third States non-CIVs such as
regional portfolio investment companies (see section
4.3.2.8), securitization companies (see section 4.3.2.9)
or real estate companies (see section 4.3.2.10).
16. In the foregoing examples, the non-tax pur-
poses seem to outweigh the fact that obtaining a
tax benefit seemed to be one of the purpose (in
some examples the tax benefit seems to be an ancil-
lary purpose). Therefore, it is reasonable to state that
when a proper factual inquiry leads to the conclusion
that the transaction/arrangement is undertaken for
bona fide purposes i.e. it pursues genuine commercial/
economic objectives/motives,61 then the subjective
element should not be satisfied62 as ‘it is unlikely
that its principal purpose will be considered to be to obtain
that benefit’. In other words, when non-tax purposes
are primary drivers of the transaction, then it cannot
be argued that ‘one of the principal purposes’ is to obtain
a tax benefit.63 Therefore, the subjective element
shall be interpreted in a ‘restrictive manner’64 in the
sense that if the transaction or arrangement at stake
has economic or commercial justifications that out-
weigh the tax advantage obtained, then this element
is not fulfilled.
3.5 The Objective Element
3.5.1 Introductory Comments
17. If the subjective element is satisfied, the tax-
payer has to prove that ‘granting that benefit is in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant
Notes
57 The term non-tax purposes should be interpreted on a much more broader basis than the term ‘business purposes’. See Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, para. 33; For an
explanation on the business purpose doctrine see Chand, Thesis, s. 3.2.4.
58 2014 OECD, Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 17 (Commentary in para. 12); 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 12); 2017 OECD
Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 180.
59 KOK, PPT, at 408–409.
60 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 13); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 181.
61 It should be noted that EU Directives, referred to previously, provide that ‘arrangements’ could be regarded to be genuine if they are put into place ‘for valid commercial reasons
which reflect economic reality’. See EU PSD, Directive 2015/121, Art. 1(3); and EU ATAD, Directive 2016/1164, Art. 6(2). Moreover, ECJ case law indicates that domestic
anti-avoidance rules (such as CFC rules), which constitute a restriction to the freedoms (such as freedom of establishment), can be justified when they relate to ‘wholly
artificial arrangements’. In other words, if the domestic anti-avoidance rules apply to arrangements that encompass economic reality then such rules will be contrary to the
freedom of establishment provisions even though the arrangement contains tax motives. See Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue, Case No: C-196/04, 12 Sept. 2006, paras 68–69. Also see Chand, Thesis, s. 22.1.2.5.
62
De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 132; Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, para. 32.
63 MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, 9 ITLR 25, 18 Aug. 2006, para. 29 and para. 57; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.3.
64 See the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek in Cussens and others, Case No: C-251/16, 7 Sept. 2017, para. 101; De Broe, EU Law, at 211.
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provisions’65 of a tax treaty. Typically, in tax avoid-
ance structures with tax treaties, a resident taxpayer
aims to ‘benefit’ from (including but not limited to)
(1) time limit thresholds such as the twelve month
threshold provided for construction related projects;
(2) ownership thresholds in the sense that substantial
shareholders can benefit from the 5% dividend with-
holding tax rate provided in Article 10(2)(a); (3)
more generally, the distributive rules contained in
Article 10 – Article 13 (in treaty or rule shopping
situations), often in combination with the double
taxation relief provisions (Article 23) and/or with
the provisions of the domestic law.66 The issue arises
as to whether the taxpayer has to prove that ‘granting
that benefit is in accordance with’ the object and pur-
pose of the ‘relevant provisions’ on an isolated basis or
the object and purpose of the ‘relevant provisions’ read
in light of the overall object and purpose of the tax
treaty?67
3.5.2 Object and Purpose of the Relevant Provisions
Read in Isolation
18. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that it is
difficult to understand the object and purpose of
the ‘relevant provisions’.68 Tax treaties, unlike domes-
tic legislation, are drafted in general terms without
highlighting the legislature’s intention to incorpo-
rate a particular rule into the tax treaty. An inter-
pretation approach which focuses only on ordinary
treaty terms will lead to the conclusion that (1) the
object and purpose of a threshold provision like that
of Article 5(3) is to provide a time threshold
limitation;69 (2) the object and purpose of a provi-
sion like that of Article 10(2) is to provide for an
arbitrary threshold of 25% for the purposes of
determining which shareholders are entitled to the
benefit of the lower rate of tax on dividends70 and
(3) the general object and purpose of the relevant
distributive rules (for instance, Articles 10, 11, 12
and 13) is only to allocate taxing rights and noth-
ing more.71 In a tax avoidance scheme, a resident
taxpayer always respects the formal conditions of
tax treaties such as the conditions imposed by the
time limit, ownership threshold or the relevant
distributive rule. Therefore, the taxpayer’s transac-
tion or arrangement in every tax avoidance transac-
tion is in accordance with the ‘object and purpose of
the relevant provisions’. If this approach is adopted,
there is no doubt that the PPT becomes redundant,
as the taxpayer will always satisfy the objective
element. Such an approach, which focuses on a
literal interpretation of ordinary treaty terms,
should be rejected.72
3.5.3 Object and Purpose of the Relevant Provisions
to be Read in Conjunction with the Context
and the Object and Purpose of the Tax Treaty
19. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that a treaty shall
be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. In
other words, the ordinary meaning of the terms used
in tax treaties should not be interpreted literally (or
in isolation) but should be interpreted in light of the
tax treaties ‘context’ and ‘object and purpose’.
20. In accordance with Article 31(2) VCLT, the
‘context’ of a tax treaty means the entire text of the
tax treaty (including its preamble and annexes), any
agreements made ancillary to the tax treaty that were
mutually agreed upon by the parties to the treaty
and any instruments made by one party and accepted
by the other party in relation to the conclusion of a
tax treaty. The documents falling into the latter two
categories would typically include mutually agreed
protocols, memorandums of understanding and notes
Notes
65 The EU Commission, in light of the anti-tax avoidance package, has suggested EU Member States to adopt a modified PPT. The modified PPT adds the phrase ‘unless it is
established that it reflects a genuine economic activity’ to the objective element of the test. It is stated that the phrase has been added to adhere to the case law of the ECJ on abuse.
See EU Commission, Recommendation on Treaty Abuse, at 1–4.
66 Other situations can also be envisaged (see s. 4).
67 Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.4.
68 De Broe, EU Law, at 213.
69 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example J).
70 Ibid., para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example E).
71 MIL (Investments) SA v. Canada, paras 73–74; Garron and another v. R; Re Garron Family Trust; Garron v. R; St Michael Trust Corp v. R; Re Fundy Settlement; Dunin v. R; St
Michael Trust Corp v. R; Re Summers by Settlement, 12 ITLR 79, 10 Sept. 2009, para. 332 & paras 362–395; Antle v. R; Marquis-Antle Spousal Trust v. R; Antle and another v.
R, para. 97–99; De Broe, Thesis, at 344.
72 Chand, Thesis, s. 5.4. Another commentator highlights the issue of focussing only on the object and purpose of the relevant provisions. See Moreno, PPT, at 436–440.
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and letters exchanged during the conclusion of a tax
treaty.73 Also, in accordance with Article 31(3)
VCLT, in addition to the ‘context’, subsequent agree-
ments which assist in application and interpretation
of a tax treaty,74 subsequent state treaty practice that
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
the interpretation of the provisions of a tax treaty75
and relevant rules of international law76 should be
taken into consideration in the tax treaty interpreta-
tion process. It should be noted that Article 31(2)
and Article 31(3) require that all the material listed
therein is in accordance with the ‘common intentions’
between the parties to a tax treaty.77 It follows from
this that unilateral explanations issued by one party
cannot be included with the ambit of Article 31
VCLT.78
21. Furthermore, the question then arises as to what
is a tax treaty’s ‘object and purpose’. In line with the
‘textual’ approach to treaty interpretation, the ‘object
and purpose’ of a tax treaty is to be ascertained from the
text of the treaty itself. Based on the text, in parti-
cular the title and preamble, the first main ‘object and
purpose’ of a tax treaty based on the OECD Model is to
avoid international double taxation (especially juridi-
cal double taxation) in order to facilitate the interna-
tional exchange of goods, services, capital and persons.
The objective of avoiding double taxation, in the
author’s opinion, is intertwined with the objective of
allocating taxing rights between contracting States.
This is because double taxation is eliminated as a
consequence of, initially, allocating taxing rights (dis-
tributive rules contained in Articles 6–22 OECD
Model) between contracting States and then applying
the relief provisions (Article 23 OECD Model).79
Secondly, the author’s position is that tax treaties
also prevent tax evasion as more often than not the
text of a treaty (preamble) sets out such an objective.80
Thirdly, the prevention of double non-taxation is not
an object and purpose of a tax treaty.81 Lastly, the
author takes a position that the prevention of tax
avoidance is not a primary objective of a tax treaty
unless and until the preamble of a treaty reflects such
a conclusion (at most it is an ancillary objective).82 In
this regard, it should be noted that Article 6(1) of the
MLI, which represents a minimum standard, has
modified the treaties preamble to read: ‘Intending to
eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by
this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxa-
tion or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance
(including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at
obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect
benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).’83 As indicated
by the OECD, it is estimated that this change will be
incorporated in more than 1,100 tax treaties.
22. Article 31(2) VCLT requires a treaty inter-
preter to refer to the preamble of the treaty. If the
provision similar to Article 6(1) of the MLI is
reflected in tax treaties, the author submits that
the objectives of (1) allocating taxing rights and
eliminating double taxation with a view to promot-
ing cross border flows (such as investments); (2) the
prevention of tax evasion; and (3) prevention of tax
avoidance (in particular, treaty shopping)84 should
be considered in the treaty interpretation process
(while interpreting the PPT85) as opposed to giving
preference to one of them. The addition of the tax
avoidance objective will ensure that ‘tax conventions
apply in accordance with the purpose for which they were
Notes
73 Vogel & Prokisch, Interpretation, at 69; Engelen, Thesis, at 429.
74 For a discussion on the legal status of mutual agreements in international law refer to Engelen, Thesis, at 431–434; Vogel & Prokisch, Interpretation, at 70–71.
75 Engelen, Thesis, at 435.
76 Ibid., at 436.
77 Chand, Thesis, s. 5.4.
78 Vogel & Prokisch, Interpretation, at 69; Vogel, Commentary, at 38; Vogel, 2015 Commentary, at 40.
79 De Broe, Thesis, at 328; Engelen, Thesis, at 428–429; 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Introduction, para. 15.2.
80 Van Weeghel, Thesis, at 34–35; De Broe, Thesis, at 330–331; Engelen, Thesis, at 428–429.
81 Beaulne & Nikolakakis, Double non taxation, at 252; Lang, Double non taxation, at 86; De Broe, Thesis, at 363; De Broe & Luts, BEPS, at 142; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.2. Also see
the opinion expressed by the Canadian Tax Court in the Garron case, paras 388–390 and the Federal Court of Australia in FC of T. v. Lamesa Holdings BV, 97 ATV 4752, at
4755.
82 Chand, Thesis, s. 5.4.
83 See 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 6(1). Also see 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, paras 72–74. Moreover, pursuant to Art. 6(3), an optional
provision, a State ‘may also choose’ to include additional preamble language which would reflect that States desire to develop economic relationships and to enhance co-
operation in tax matters. See 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 6(3).
84 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Introduction, paras 16.1–16.2.
85 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 5); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 173.
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entered into, i.e. to provide benefits in respect of bona fide
exchanges of goods and services, and movements of capital
and persons’.86 Thus, the object and purpose of the
‘relevant provisions’ have to be read in light of the
object and purpose of the entire tax treaty.
Moreover, to the extent relevant, other treaty objec-
tives such as elimination of tax discrimination as
provided in Article 24 OECD Model and the estab-
lishment of a MAP as per Article 25 OECD Model
should be taken into consideration.87 It is pertinent
to note that the object and purpose of the ‘relevant
provisions’ should be determined by reference to the
treaty provisions only and not by referring to domes-
tic (taxing) provisions in combination with treaty
provisions.88
3.5.4 Suggested Interpretation Approach
23. The author submits that a two-stage analysis
will be required to ascertain the object and purpose
of the ‘relevant provisions’. Under the first stage, the
taxpayer has to determine the object and purpose of
the ‘relevant provisions’ in light of the objectives pur-
sued by the tax treaty (legal analysis). Thereafter,
under the second stage, taxpayer will have to prove
that the transaction/arrangement respects the object
and purpose of the ‘relevant provisions’ at stake (appli-
cation of the legal analysis to the facts at stake).89
Consider the following positive and negative
situations.
24. For instance, in Example E (positive situation)
to the PPT (see margin no. 37), the facts indicate that
the taxpayer satisfied the subjective element, as the
sole purpose to increase his shareholding was to take
benefit of the reduced rate of 5% provided under
Article 10(2)(a). Under the first stage, the taxpayer
will establish that (1) the object and purpose of
Article 10(2)(a) is to provide for a lower withholding
tax rate for substantial shareholders (2) the object
and purpose of tax treaties is to (a) allocate taxing
rights and eliminate double taxation with a view to
promote cross border investments; (b) prevention of
tax evasion and (c) prevention of tax avoidance
(in particular, treaty shopping). Under the second
stage, the taxpayer can establish that he has acted
in accordance with (1) the object and purpose of
Article 10(2)(a) in light of his compliance with the
ownership requirement imposed by that provision i.
e. owning more than 25% of the payer; and (2) the
object and purpose of tax treaties as (a) he has
complied with the intent of tax treaties which is to
promote cross border investment; (b) the transaction
does not represent a tax evasion scheme; (c) a tax
avoidance motive does not exist as the transaction
represents a ‘genuine’/ ‘bonafide’ and not ‘artificial’
increase of shareholding. Therefore, the PPT would
not apply as the taxpayer will be able to establish
that the principal purpose of seeking the tax benefit
was within the object, spirit and purpose of the
provisions that confer the tax benefit.
25. On the other hand, in Example J to the PPT
(see margin no. 34), the facts indicate that RCO
satisfies subjective element, as one of the principal
purposes (or the sole purpose) for RCO to enter into
an arrangement with SUBCo is to obtain a tax
benefit. Under the first stage, RCO will establish
that (1) the object and purpose of Article 5(3) is to
provide for a time threshold of twelve months before
a taxpayer triggers a construction permanent estab-
lishment (PE) (2) the object and purpose of tax
treaties is to (a) allocate taxing rights and eliminate
double taxation with a view to promote cross border
investments; (b) prevention of tax evasion and (c)
prevention of tax avoidance. Under the second
stage, RCO will be able to demonstrate that it has
acted in accordance with (1) the object and purpose
of Article 5(3) as it does not carry out its activities
for more than twelve months; and (2) the object and
purpose of tax treaties as (a) it has complied with the
intent of tax treaties which is to promote cross
border activities; and (b) the transaction does not
represent a tax evasion scheme. With respect (c) it
will be difficult for RCO to prove that its transaction
represents a ‘genuine’/ ‘bonafide’ transaction, as an
objective analysis of the facts would indicate the
presence of a high degree of ‘artificiality’. Therefore,
the PPT would apply as the taxpayer will not be able
to establish that the principal purpose of seeking the
tax benefit was within the object, spirit and purpose
of the provisions that confer the tax benefit. This
Notes
86 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 6); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 174.
87 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Introduction, para. 15.5.
88 Antle case: para. 99.
89 See Canada Trust Co Mortgage Co v. Canada, paras 44–62; Chand, Thesis, s. 9.3.4.
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being said, the analysis would be different, at the
subjective and objective level, if sufficient non-tax
reasons were provided for splitting the arrangements.
4 APPLICATION OF THE PPT TO VARIOUS
FACT PATTERNS: CRITICAL COMMENTS
4.1 Introductory Comments
26. The commentary analyses the impact of the
PPT on thirteen-fact patterns.90 It is clear that a
few of these fact patterns are inspired from Court
judgments. Moreover, the six additional examples,
which are discussed in the context of conduit
arrangements, should also be considered in light
of the PPT.91 These six examples directly resemble
the examples contained in the exchange of letters
(EOL) between the US92 and the UK93 to interpret
the anti-conduit provision contained in Article 3(1)
(n) of the 2001 US-UK tax treaty, especially, with
respect to the provisions dealing with dividends,94
interest95 and royalties.96 Therefore, nineteen
examples are analysed in light of the PPT. The
author comments on all examples by dividing
them into two groups. The first group discusses
fact patterns where the application of the PPT
leads to the conclusion that treaty benefits will be
denied (see section 4.2). The second group discusses
fact patterns where treaty benefits are to be granted
(see section 4.3). Thereafter, the author concludes by
discussing other fact patterns that could be subject
to the PPT (see section 4.4). It should be noted that
the author will not repeat the facts of each example.
The reader is kindly requested to read the relevant
portions of the commentary and the EOL between
the US and UK on the anti-conduit provision
before reading the author’s comments.
4.2 Fact Patterns Under Which the Treaty
Benefit Is Denied
4.2.1 Treaty Shopping Arrangements
27. The facts in Example A97 are similar to the facts
of the 1994 Royal Dutch Oil Company/Marketmaker
judgment.98 In that case, the UK stockbroker was
considered, by the Dutch Supreme Court, to be the
beneficial owner of the dividends and hence was entitled
to the 15% rate contained in the 1980 UK-NL tax
treaty, even though the transaction was undertaken
for pure tax avoidance purposes. However, in the
context of Example A, the commentary states that
the subject element is satisfied as ‘one of the principal
purposes for the arrangement under which TCO assigned the
right to the payment of dividends to RCO was for RCO to
obtain the benefit of the exemption from source taxation of
dividends’. With respect to the objective element, the
commentary provides ‘it would be contrary to the object
and purpose of the tax convention to grant the benefit of that
exemption under this treaty-shopping arrangement’. While
the author agrees with the outcome as the sole pur-
pose of the arrangement was to avoid source taxation,
a downside of this example is that it only takes into
consideration the treaties overall object and purpose
and does not discuss the object and purpose of the
provision that is being abused i.e. Article 10.
28. Example B99 resembles the 2006 Bank of
Scotland judgment.100 In that case, a US Co sold
its rights to dividends on preference shares in its
French subsidiary to a UK bank (the taxpayer).
This was essentially done because Article 7 of the
1968 UK-French tax treaty provided that a UK
resident could claim the ‘avoir fiscal’ from the
French treasury when a dividend distribution was
made to it. However, the French Supreme Court
(Conseil d’Etat) denied treaty benefits to the
Notes
90 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182.
91 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187.
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99 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example B); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example B.
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taxpayer and ruled in favour of the tax authorities.
The Court upheld the applicability of the domestic
‘abuse of law’ provision and provided that pursuant
to this provision the arrangement was a loan from
the taxpayer to the US Co which was repayable by
the dividends from the French Co and the ‘avoir
fiscal’ from the French treasury. In essence, the
Court re-classified the transaction and upheld
that the income recipient for tax purposes was
the US Co.101 In the context of Example B, the
commentary states that the subject element is
satisfied as ‘one of the principal purposes for the
arrangement under which RCO acquired the usufruct
of the preferred shares issued by SCO was to obtain
the benefit of the 5 per cent limitation’. With respect
to the objective element, the commentary provides
‘it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the tax
convention to grant the benefit of that limitation under
this treaty-shopping arrangement’. While the author
agrees with the outcome of the example as it is
driven with the sole purpose to avoid source taxa-
tion, once again, the downside is that the com-
mentary only takes into consideration the treaties
overall object and purpose and does not discuss the
object and purpose of the relevant provision that is
being abused i.e. Article 10.
29. Example A102 to the commentary on anti-con-
duits directly resembles the fact pattern contained in
Example 1 of the EOL with respect to the interpreta-
tion of the anti-conduit provision (Article 3(1)(n)) in
the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.103 In Example 1, the US
considers that treaty benefits shall not be granted.
However, in the reverse situation, the UK believes
that although the objective test of that provision is
satisfied (Article 3(1)(n)(i)), the motive test will not be
met (Article 3(1)(n)(ii)). This is because UK does not
impose a withholding tax on dividends and therefore
there is no treaty benefit from a UK perspective. In the
context of Example A, the commentary states ‘This
arrangement constitutes a conduit arrangement … because
one of the principal purposes for RCO participating in the
transaction was to achieve a reduction of the withholding tax
for TCO’. If these facts had to be analysed under the
PPT, the author’s opinion is that the subjective ele-
ment should be satisfied as the transaction was struc-
tured with the sole purpose to eliminate source
taxation. Moreover, with respect to the objective ele-
ment, if one reads Article 10 (the purpose of which is
to allocate taxing rights) in light of the treaties pre-
amble, it could be difficult for the taxpayer to establish
that treaty benefits should be extended to this treaty
shopping arrangement.
30. Example C104 to the commentary on anti-con-
duits directly resembles the fact pattern contained in
Example 3 of the EOL with respect to the interpre-
tation of the anti-conduit provision (Article 3(1)(n))
in the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.105 Both the US and
UK consider that treaty benefits shall not be granted
in that example. Moreover, the example seems to
contain a mixture of facts discussed in the 1971
Aiken Industries case106 and the 1997 Northern
Indiana Public Service case.107
31. In the Aiken case, a Bahamas resident cor-
poration viz., ECL had initially given a loan to its
indirect subsidiary viz., MPI, a US resident cor-
poration. As a tax treaty did not exist between the
Bahamas and the US, the interest payments made
by MPI to ECL were subject to a 30% withhold-
ing tax in the US. In order to avoid this with-
holding tax, ECL assigned the loan to its newly
incorporated indirect subsidiary viz., Industrias, a
corporation resident in Honduras in exchange for
several promissory notes (these notes, in principle,
contained the same features of the loan that now
existed between Industrias and MPL). By doing
this, the taxpayer sought to take advantage of
Article 9 of the 1964 USA-Honduras tax treaty,
which provided that the US source interest, was
exempt from the 30% withholding tax. In essence,
the structure was a back-to-back loan arrangement
pursuant to which the interest received by
Industrias was passed on to ECL. As the structure
was set up solely to avoid the US withholding tax,
the US tax authorities denied the treaty benefits to
Notes
101 For a detailed analysis of the judgment see: De Broe, Thesis, at 697–702; Chand, Thesis, s. 13.4.10; Gutmann, Beneficial Ownership, at 167–182; Ringler, Beneficial
Ownership, at 233–235.
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Industrias. They argued that Industrias should be
disregarded for tax purposes and ECL should be
deemed the true owner and recipient of the inter-
est income. The US Tax Court did agree with the
tax authority’s argument that the recipient of the
interest income was not Industrias but ECL. The
Court held that the term ‘received by’ as provided in
Article 9 of the tax treaty was an undefined treaty
term. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 2(2) of the
1964 tax treaty reference was made to the domes-
tic tax law of the US to ascertain its meaning.
Thereafter, the Court, by referring to the domestic
judicial anti-avoidance doctrines, held that the
interest income was ‘received by’ MPI as opposed
to Industrias since the latter did not have any
economic substance or business purpose and was
set up only for tax avoidance purposes. However,
the facts of the Aiken case, can be contrasted with
Example C as in the latter case, RCO retains a
spread of 1%.108
32. On the other hand, in the Northern Indiana
Public Service (NIPS) case, the US Court of Appeals
ruled in favour of the taxpayer.109 This case dealt
with a structure that was set up to exploit the
beneficial provisions of the 1948 USA-Netherlands
tax treaty as extended to the Netherlands Antilles. A
US Corporation viz., NIPSCO wished to borrow
money from the Eurobond market. To achieve this
NIPSCO incorporated a Netherlands Antilles cor-
poration viz., Finance. Finance issued loan notes
worth seventy million Euro on the Eurobond market
at an interest rate of 17.25%. Subsequently, Finance
loaned the proceeds obtained from the Eurobond
issue at an interest rate of 18.25% to NIPSCO.
Thus, the main issue that arose in this case was
whether the interest payments made by NIPSCO to
Finance were eligible for treaty benefits i.e. whether
the interest paid was exempt from US withholding
taxes pursuant to Article 8(1) of the 1948 tax treaty?
The US Court of Appeals decided the case in favour
of the taxpayer by providing that:
Finance was set up to obtain capital at the lowest possible
interest rates. Accessing the Eurobond market through a
Netherlands Antilles subsidiary was not, at the time, an
uncommon practice to accomplish this end. The record
demonstrates that Finance ‘was managed as a viable concern,
and not as simply a lifeless facade.’ … Finance conducted
recognizable business activity – concededly minimal activity,
but business activity nonetheless. Significantly, Finance
derived a profit. It earned income on the spread between the
interest rate it charged Taxpayer on the Note (18.25 percent)
and the rate it paid to the Euronote holders (17.25 percent).
The foreign corporation in Aiken Industries was held to lack
dominion and control because, unlike Finance, it was literally
a mere conduit, earning no profit on its borrowing and lending
activities … Finance netted an annual $700,000 from its
borrowing and lending activities. That income stream had
economic substance to both Taxpayer and Finance. Each time
Taxpayer made an interest payment to Finance, Taxpayer’s
economic resources were diminished while Finance’s economic
position was enhanced. Finance also reinvested the annual
$700,000 interest income in order to generate additional
interest income. Taxpayer had no control over Finance’s rein-
vestments. Finally, the transactions in Aiken Industries were
entirely between related parties. Finance, on the other hand,
borrowed funds from unrelated third parties, the Euronote
holders.
The facts of this case, can be contrasted with
Example C as in the latter case, the transactions are
among related parties.
33. In the context of Example C, the commentary
states ‘The transaction through which RCO acquired the
note issued by SCO constitutes a conduit arrangement.’ If
these facts had to be analysed under the PPT, the
author’s opinion is that the subjective element
should be satisfied as the transaction was structured
with the sole purpose to eliminate source taxation.
Moreover, with respect to the objective element, if
one reads Article 11 (the purpose of the provision is
to allocate taxing rights on interest related income)
in light of the treaties preamble, it could be difficult
for the taxpayer to establish that treaty benefits
should be extended to this treaty shopping
arrangement.
4.2.2 Contract Splitting: Circumvention of the Twelve
Month Threshold
34. This fact pattern of Example J110 has been
considered abusive in the OECD Commentary since
1992.111 The UN Commentary also considers
Notes
108 For a detailed analysis of the judgment see: De Broe, Thesis, at 424–426; Chand,Thesis, s. 13.4.1; Brauner, BeneficialOwnership, at 146–148; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 200–202.
109 For a detailed analysis of the judgment see: De Broe, Thesis, at 426–428; Chand, Thesis, s. 13.4.4; Brauner, Beneficial Ownership, at 148–151; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 206.
110 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example J); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example J.
111 1992 OECD Comm. Art. 5, para. 18. Also see the decision of the German Federal Fiscal Court : Case No. IR 99/97, 21 Apr. 1999 as reported in the IBFD case law database.
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similar fact patterns as abusive112 in the context of
construction as well as service PEs.113 In fact,
Article 14 of the MLI114 (in light of BEPS Action
7)115 has recommended States to adopt a specific
anti-avoidance rule (SAAR) in their tax treaties to
counter contract splitting. For States that do not
adopt the contract splitting provision, it becomes
pertinent to check whether or not the PPT applies
(whenever the PE concept in a tax treaty uses a time
limit threshold). In relation to Example J, the
author agrees that the subjective element will be
satisfied, as one of the principal purposes for RCO
to enter into this arrangement with SUBCo is to
obtain a tax benefit (the analysis would be different
if several non-tax or commercial purposes were put
forward). With respect to the objective element, the
commentary states ‘granting the benefit of that rule in
these circumstances would be contrary to the object and
purpose of that paragraph as the time limitation of that
paragraph would otherwise be meaningless’. In other
words, the commentary seems to indicate that (1)
the object and purpose of that paragraph is to
provide for a time threshold of twelve months;
and (2) the taxpayer can benefit from the time
threshold only in genuine circumstances i.e. the
transaction does not contain any abuse (tax avoid-
ance) element such as contract splitting among
related parties. Unlike the analysis in other exam-
ples, in this example the commentary discusses the
object and purpose of the provision that is being
abused.
4.3 Fact Patterns Under Which Treaty
Benefits are Granted
4.3.1 Direct Investment Scenarios: Two State
Situations
35. With respect to Example C,116 the commen-
tary provides that the PPT rule will not apply
even though the investment is made taking into
consideration the benefits under the R-S treaty.
This is mainly because ‘the principal purpose of mak-
ing the investment and building the plant’ are related
to RCOs expansion strategy and to benefit from
low manufacturing costs (‘tax purposes’ seem to be
ancillary). Moreover, with respect to the objective
element it is stated that as ‘a general objective of tax
conventions is to encourage cross-border investment’,
obtaining the benefits is in accordance with the
object and purpose of the provisions of that con-
vention. From a tax treaty policy perspective, it is
quite obvious that the PPT should not apply to
these facts. However, the author wonders what tax
benefits does RCO seek under the R-S tax treaty?
If RCO sets up a plant in State S, then RCO will
be considered to have a PE therein under Article 5
(1) or Article 5(3). In this situation, the treaty
benefit that RCO may receive is (1) an exemption
or credit for the taxes paid in State S on the
assumption that relief from double taxation is
not provided in the domestic tax law of State R
(2) attribution of profits to the PE in accordance
with the principles contained in Article 7 and not
in accordance with domestic law; and (3) applica-
tion of the non-discrimination provisions (Article
24(3)) to prevent State S from levying discrimina-
tory taxation against the PE. The example needs
further facts and clarifications.
36. In Example D,117 RCO (the CIV), a tax
resident of State R, invests in State S. Majority
of the investors in RCO are from State R and a
minority of investors are from other States (States
that have not concluded a tax treaty with State S).
At the outset, the author agrees that a tax benefit
exists i.e. the withholding tax is reduced from
30% to 10%. The question then arises as to
whether the subject element is satisfied. The
facts indicate ‘RCO’s investment decisions take into
account the existence of tax benefits provided under
State R’s extensive tax convention network’.
Accordingly, it could be argued that the subjective
element is met. However, the facts also indicate
that ‘Investors’ decisions to invest in RCO are not driven
by any particular investment made by RCO, and RCO’s
investment strategy is not driven by the tax position of
its investors. RCO annually distributes almost all of its
Notes
112 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, para. 96.
113 2011 UN Comm. Art. 5, para. 11.
114 See 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 14.
115 2015 OECD, Final Report on Permanent Establishments, paras 16–17 (commentary to new Art. 5(3) in para. 18); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 5, paras 52–53.
116 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example C); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example C.
117 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example D); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example D.
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income to its investors and pays taxes in State R on
income not distributed during the year’. In light of
these additional facts, the author’s opinion is that
the subjective element is not satisfied. Thus, we
do not need to analyse the case under the objective
element. Nonetheless, if required, with respect to
the objective element, the taxpayer could argue
that ‘The intent of tax treaties is to provide benefits to
encourage crossborder investment and, therefore, to deter-
mine whether or not paragraph 7 applies to an invest-
ment, it is necessary to consider the context in which the
investment was made’. In this example, the context
would indicate that RCO carries out genuine
investment activity in light of the funds mandate
and this investment does not represent a treaty
shopping arrangement wherein the income is
passed on to residents of third States (rather it is
passed to majority of the investors resident in
State R). Arguably, based on this fact pattern,
RCO may also satisfy the detailed version of the
LOB clause i.e. Article X(2)(g).118
37. The facts in example E119 indicate that RCO
has held 24% of the share capital of SCO for the
last five years. Following the entry into force of a
tax treaty between State R and State S, RCO
increased its participation in SCO. This was pri-
marily done to take benefit of the reduced rate of
5% provided under Article 10(2)(a). The commen-
tary provides that the PPT will not apply even
though the sole principal purpose of the transac-
tion was to obtain the treaty benefit (subjective
test is satisfied). This is mainly because the tax-
payer may establish that granting the benefits is in
accordance with the object and purpose of Article
10(2)(a). Specifically, the taxpayer could argue that
(1) Article 10(2)(a) uses an arbitrary threshold of
25% for the purposes of determining which share-
holders are entitled to the benefit of the lower
rate; and (2) the taxpayer has genuinely increased
its participation in SCO i.e. its transaction does
not contain any abuse (tax avoidance) element such
as a quick purchase and sale. Unlike the analysis
in other examples (except Example J on contract
splitting), in this example the commentary dis-
cusses the object and purpose of the provision
that the taxpayer is trying to take advantage of i.
e. Article 10(2)(a).
4.3.2 Investments by Intermediaries: Three
(or More) State Situations
4.3.2.1 Investment by an Operating Company
that Satisfies the LOB Active Conduct
Test
38. Example B120 on the commentary to anti-con-
duit arrangements directly resembles the fact pattern
contained in Example 2 of the EOL with respect to
the interpretation of the anti-conduit provision
(Article 3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.121
Both the US and UK consider that treaty benefits
shall be granted, especially, because RCO satisfies
the active conduct test of the LOB clause.122 In the
context of Example B, the commentary, in line with
the US and UK’s position, reaches a similar conclu-
sion. It is stated that the fact pattern refers to a:
normal commercial structure where RCO and SCO carry on
real economic activities in States R and S. The payment of
dividends by subsidiaries such as SCO is a normal business
transaction. In the absence of evidence showing that one of the
principal purposes for setting up that structure was to flow-
through dividends from SCO to TCO, this structure would not
constitute a conduit arrangement.
If these facts had to be analysed under the PPT, the
author’s opinion is that the subjective element
should not be satisfied, especially, in light of several
non-tax purposes. Thus, we do not need to analyse
the case under the objective element. Nonetheless, if
required, with respect to the objective element, if
one reads Article 10 in light of the treaties preamble,
the taxpayer can establish that this arrangement is
not a treaty shopping arrangement whereby the
income is passed on to residents of third States.
Notes
118 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, paras 55–67.
119 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example E); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example E.
120 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example B); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 189, Example B.
121 Exchange of Letters on Interpretation of Art. 3(1)(n) of the US-UK Tax Treaty, Example 2.
122 The taxpayer will satisfy the detailed and simplified LOB clause. See 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 25, at 36–42.
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4.3.2.2 Conducting International Business
Through the Creation of an Operating
and Holding Company
39. In Example H,123 RCO, a tax resident of State
R, that is owned by TCO, a third State resident,
invests in SCO (a tax resident of State S) through
loans and equity. Although it is not clear as to what
the tax treaty benefit is in this example, it is rational
to assume that State S domestic withholding tax on
interest and dividends is reduced under the R-S tax
treaty.
40. The question then arises as to whether the sub-
ject element is satisfied? In this regard, several aspects
need to be considered separately. The first aspect
relates to establishment of RCO in State R. The
facts indicate that TCO had difficulties in conducting
its international business from State T mainly because
of issues related to transportation, time differences,
limited availability of personnel fluent in foreign
languages and the foreign location of business part-
ners. Thus, in order to develop a base for its foreign
business activities, TCO establishes RCO. The second
aspect relates to selecting State R. It is stated that
State R is selected because of its developed interna-
tional trade and financial markets and abundance of
highly qualified human resources. The third aspect
relates to the activities carried out by the intermediary
in State R. The facts state that RCO carries on diverse
business activities such as wholesaling, retailing, man-
ufacturing, financing and domestic and international
investment. RCO’s employees (personnel working in
areas such as legal, finance, accounting, taxation, risk
management, auditing and internal control) perform
these activities. Furthermore, RCO possesses the
necessary financial resources to conduct its activities.
Consequently, in light of the three aspects, it is clear
that RCO carries out genuine economic activities that
may constitute an active conduct of business. The
fourth aspect relates to RCOs investment in SCO.
The facts indicate that RCO, as part of its business
activities, also invests in SCO through loans and
equity.
41. Given these facts, it is clear that RCOs crea-
tion in State R and its investment in SCO are not
driven with the purposes of avoiding taxes in State S.
Therefore, the subjective element should not be
satisfied. The commentary correctly reaches this con-
clusion and states ‘RCO has been established for business
efficiency reasons and its financing of SCO through equity
and loans is part of RCO’s active conduct of a business in
State R’.
4.3.2.3 Acquisition of a Holding Company
that Owns Shares and Patents
42. In Example F,124 RCO, a tax resident of State
R that is owned by private residents of the same
State, is the family owned holding company of a
group that is active in the information technology
(IT) sector. RCOs key assets consist of shares in
several neighbouring subsidiaries, including a sub-
sidiary in State S (SCO), and patents that are licensed
to the subsidiaries, including to SCO. Dividends and
royalties stemming from these shares and patents are
subject to low/nil taxes in the State of source (includ-
ing State S) due to favourable tax treaties. TCO
(listed company), a resident of State T, which oper-
ates in the IT business, acquires the shares of RCO in
order to expand its business. State T does not have a
tax treaty with State S. Based on this fact pattern;
can the PPT be applied to RCO to deny treaty
benefits with respect to the dividend and royalty
income? In the author’s opinion, this should not be
the case. With respect to the subjective element the
commentary correctly states ‘it would be reasonable to
conclude that the principal purposes for the acquisition of
RCO are related to the expansion of the business of the
TCO group and do not include the obtaining of benefits
under the treaty between States R and S. The fact that
RCO acts primarily as a holding company does not change
that result’. This being said, the example does not
provide detailed facts with respect to post acquisi-
tion scenarios. The commentary states:
It might well be that, after the acquisition of the shares of
RCO, TCO’s management will consider the benefits of the tax
treaty concluded between State R and State S before deciding to
keep in RCO the shares of SCO and the patents licensed to SCO.
This, however, would not be a purpose related to the relevant
transaction, which is the acquisition of the shares of RCO.125
Notes
123 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example H); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example H.
124 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example F); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example F.
125 It should be noted that Danish Courts have ruled on whether or not acquisition vehicles can be considered to be ‘beneficial owners’ for the purposes of the articles that deal
with dividend and interest in Danish tax treaties. See Bundgaard, Beneficial Ownership, at 94–108; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 251–260.
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4.3.2.4 Intra Group Services Company
43. In Example G,126 RCO, a tax resident of State
R, that is owned by TCO, a third State resident,
provides intra group services to five associated enter-
prises. Although it is not clear as to what the tax
treaty benefit is in this example, it is rational to
assume that the tax treaties between State R and
the States of the associated enterprises, restrict the
latter States from imposing their domestic withhold-
ing taxes on service related income. For example,
let’s assume that the domestic law of the source
State imposes a high withholding tax on services
income (20%). The taxpayer could then contend
that Article 7 restricts the State of source from
taxing that services income unless and until a PE
exists therein. Alternatively, if the treaty contains a
fee for technical services provision, which provides
for a lower rate (10%), it could be contended that
the lower rate should be applied.
44. The question then arises as to whether the
subject element is satisfied? The first aspect relates
to establishment of RCO in State R. The facts indi-
cate that TCO establishes RCO, a regional company,
for the purpose of providing intra group services to
its associated enterprises. Such services include man-
agement related services (such as accounting, legal
advice and human resources),127 financing and treas-
ury services (such as managing currency risks and
arranging hedging transactions)128 and other non-
financing related services. The second aspect relates
to selecting State R. After considering different loca-
tions, TCO chooses State R because of the availabil-
ity of skilled work force, dependable legal system,
business friendly setting, political stability, member-
ship of a regional block, sophisticated banking
industry and the comprehensive double taxation
treaty network of State R, including its tax treaties
with the five States in which TCO owns subsidiaries.
The third aspect relates to the activities carried out
by the intermediary in State R.
45. If an accurate delineation of the transaction129
through a proper functional analysis130 indicates that
RCO (1) through its personnel renders the services to
the associated enterprises (2) RCO employs tangible
assets in providing its services and (3) RCO, through
its personnel, controls and has the financial capacity
to assume the risks associated with the services,131
then it is clear that RCO carries out genuine eco-
nomic activity for which it should be entitled to
service related fees from its associated enterprises.
Therefore, the subjective element should not be
satisfied. The commentary correctly reaches this con-
clusion and states ‘it would not be reasonable to deny the
benefits of the treaties concluded between State R and the
five States where the subsidiaries operate’.
4.3.2.5 Intra Group Financing Company
46. Example F132 to the commentary on anti-con-
duits directly resembles the fact pattern contained in
Example 6 of the EOL with respect to the interpre-
tation of the anti-conduit provision (Article 3(1)(n))
in the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.133 The US, being
the source State, considers that treaty benefits shall
be granted as the UKCo performs significant activ-
ities and the main purposes of entering into the
arrangement is not for avoiding US withholding
tax. Likewise in the reverse situation, the UK,
being the source State, considers that treaty benefits
shall also be granted, as the USCO appears to be a
real business performing substantive economic func-
tions, using real assets and assuming real risks.
Further, the USCO appears to be bearing the interest
rate and currency risk and thus carries out its busi-
ness in a commercial manner. In the context of
Example F, the commentary, in line with the US
and UK’s position, states in the absence of facts
which would indicate that ‘one of the principal purposes
for these loans was the avoidance of withholding tax in
State S, the loan from TCO to RCO and the loan from
RCO to SCO do not constitute a conduit arrangement’.
Notes
126 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example G); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example G.
127 These services seem to be low value added services. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para. 7.49.
128 These services cannot be considered to be low value added services. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para. 7.47.
129 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, paras 1.35–1.36.
130 Ibid., paras 1.51–1.55.
131 Ibid., paras 1.56–1.106.
132 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example F); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example F.
133 Exchange of Letters on Interpretation of Art. 3(1)(n) of the US-UK Tax Treaty, Example 6.
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47. If these facts had to be analysed under the
PPT, the author’s opinion is that the subjective
element should not be satisfied. This is because (1)
RCO is established with the purpose of carrying out
financing activities and (2) RCO carries out these
activities through fifty employees (3) RCO employs
the relevant assets; and (4) RCO, through its person-
nel, controls and has the financial capacity to assume
the risks (financial risks)134 associated with those
activities.135 In other words, RCO carries out genu-
ine economic activity and its investment in SCO is
made in light of its core treasury business.
4.3.2.6 Intra Group Intellectual Property Licensing
48. Example E136 on the commentary on anti-con-
duit arrangements directly resembles the fact pattern
contained in Example 5 of the EOL with respect to
the interpretation of the anti-conduit provision
(Article 3(1)(n)) in the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.137
The US, being the source State, considers that treaty
benefits shall be granted and the transaction shall
not be considered as a conduit arrangement. The UK
in the reverse situation, on the other hand, believes
that although the objective test of that provision is
satisfied (income is being forwarded), the motive test
will not be met. It is stated that as:
XCo is conforming to the standard commercial organisation
and behaviour of the group in the way that it structures its
licensing and sub-licensing activities and assuming the same
structure is employed with respect to other subsidiaries carry-
ing out similar activities in countries which have treaties
which offer similar or more favourable benefits, the inference
would be that the absence of a treaty between country X and
the UK is not influencing the motive for the transactions
described. Therefore even though the specific fact pattern, as
presented, meets the first part of the definition of a ‘conduit
arrangement’ at Article 3(l)(n)(i), on balance the conclusion
would be that the main purpose or one of the main purposes’
of the transactions was not the obtaining of UK/US treaty
benefits. So the structure would not constitute a conduit
arrangement.
In the context of Example E, the commentary, in
line with the UK’s position, reaches a similar con-
clusion. If these facts had to be analysed under the
PPT, the author’s opinion is that the subjective
element should not be satisfied. This is because the
licensing transactions are driven primarily by non-
tax purposes (commercial reasons) and are not struc-
tured with the sole intention to eliminate source
taxation. Thus, we do not need to analyse the case
under the objective element.138
4.3.2.7 Funding by a Unrelated Bank in Light
of a Bank Deposit
49. Example D139 on anti-conduit arrangements,
directly resembles the fact pattern contained in
Example 4 of the EOL with respect to the inter-
pretation of the anti-conduit provision (Article 3
(1)(n)) in the 2001 US-UK Tax Treaty.140 The US,
being the source State, considers that treaty bene-
fits shall be granted and the transaction shall not
be considered as a conduit arrangement. This is
because the ‘UKCo is unrelated to USCO and XCo in
determining whether there is a conduit arrangement.
Accordingly, this will be treated as a conduit arrange-
ment only if UKCo would not have entered into the
transaction on substantially the same terms in the
absence of the XCo deposit. Under these facts, there is
no conduit arrangement’.141 On the other hand, the
UK, being the source State, differentiates between
two situations. The first scenario provides that the
USCO lends to the UKCo without a matching
collateral deposit from XCo (and in light of
other reasons) and the second scenario provides
that the USCO lends to the UKCo only in light
of a matching collateral deposit from XCo.
Notes
134 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, paras 1.56–1.106.
135 Chand, Loans, at 896–898; Chand, Cash Pooling, at 40–42.
136 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example E); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example E; Also see the
discussion on the US SDI Netherlands (1996) case in Brauner, Beneficial Ownership, at 149–154; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 207–208. Also see the Velcro Canada Case
(2012) in Arnold, Beneficial Ownership, at 44–48; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 229–230.
137 Exchange of Letters on Interpretation of Art. 3(1)(n) of the US-UK Tax Treaty, Example 5.
138 This being said, one may question whether the intermediary should be entitled to the returns from a transfer pricing perspective. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
paras 6.47–6.72.
139 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example D); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example D.
140 Exchange of Letters on Interpretation of Art. 3(1)(n) of the US-UK Tax Treaty, Example 4.
141 Also see Rev. Rul. 87–89, 1987–2, C.B. 195; Ringler, Beneficial Ownership, at 205–206.
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50. With respect to the second situation, the UKs
position is that:
if USCO’s decision to lend to UKCo was dependent on XCo
providing a matching collateral deposit to secure the loan, the
indication would be that XCo was in substance lending to
UKCo direct but in form routing the loan through a bank with
whom it has a close relationship in order to obtain the benefit of
the treaty. In such circumstances the transactions would consti-
tute a conduit arrangement as defined by the treaty.
In the context of Example D, the commentary, in line
with the UK’s position, reaches a similar conclusion.
If these facts had to be analysed under the PPT, the
author’s opinion is that the subjective element should
be satisfied as the transaction was structured with the
sole purpose to eliminate source taxation. Moreover,
with respect to the objective element, if one reads
Article 11 in light of the treaties preamble, it could
be concluded ‘it would be contrary to the object and purpose
of the tax convention to grant the benefit of that exemption
under this treaty-shopping arrangement’.
51. On the other hand, with respect to the first
situation, the UKs position is that:
The fact that UK/US treaty benefits are available if UKCo
borrows from USCO, and that similar benefits might not be
available if it borrowed elsewhere, is clearly a factor in
UKCo’s decision (which may be influenced by advice given
to it by its 100% shareholder). It may even be a decisive
factor, in the sense that, all else being equal, the availability
of treaty benefits may swing the balance in favour of borrow-
ing from USCO rather than from another lender. However,
whether the obtaining of treaty benefits was ‘the main purpose
or one of the main purposes’ of the transaction would have to be
determined by reference to the particular facts and circum-
stances. Similarly, for the anti-conduit provision to apply it
would have to be established that the interest paid by UKCo
was ‘flowing through’ USCO to XCo. … On the specific facts
as presented, the transactions would not constitute a conduit
arrangement as defined by the treaty.
In the context of Example D, the commentary, in
line with the UK’s position, reaches a similar con-
clusion. The author agrees with this outcome.
4.3.2.8 Investment by a Regional Portfolio
Investment Company
52. In Example K,142 an institutional investor, a
State T resident, wholly owns RCO, a tax resident of
State R. RCO acts as a regional investment platform
that acquires and manages a diversified portfolio of
private market investments in several States (includ-
ing State R). RCO invests in SCO, a resident of State
S. The treaty benefit that RCO derives is that the
State S domestic withholding tax on dividends is
reduced from 30% to 5% under the R-S tax treaty.
53. The question then arises as to whether the
subject element is satisfied? In this regard, several
aspects need to be considered separately. The first
aspect relates to establishment of RCO in State R.
It is clear that the fund establishes RCO to gen-
erate investment related returns through the
acquisition and management of a diversified port-
folio of private market investments. The second
aspect relates to selecting Sate R. The facts indi-
cate that State R was selected because of (1) the
availability of knowledgeable directors with
knowledge of regional business practices and reg-
ulations (2) the existence of a skilled multilingual
workforce (3) State R’s membership of a regional
grouping and (4) the extensive tax convention net-
work of State R, including its tax convention with
State S, which provides for low withholding tax
rates. The third aspect relates to the activities
carried out by the intermediary in State R. The
facts state that RCOs activities are carried out by
(1) a board of directors that are comprised of a
majority of State R residents (with expertise in
investment management) and the members of
Fund’s global management team; and (2) an
experienced local management team that reviews
investment recommendations from the Fund and
performs various other functions such as approving
and monitoring investments, carrying on treasury
functions, maintaining RCO’s books and records,
and ensuring compliance with regulatory require-
ments in States where it invests. In light of these
three aspects, it is clear that RCO’s carries out
genuine economic activities in State R. The fourth
aspect relates to RCOs investment in SCO. The
facts indicate that RCO, in addition to other
investments in the region, also invests in SCO.
54. Given these facts, it is clear that RCOs crea-
tion in State R and its investment in SCO are not
driven with the principal purpose of avoiding taxes
in State S even though ‘RCO considers the existence of a
benefit under the State R-State S tax convention with
Notes
142 2017 OECD, Discussion Draft on Non-CIV Examples, para. 9 (Example 1); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example K.
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respect to dividends’. Therefore, the subjective element
should not be satisfied. The commentary correctly
reaches this conclusion and states that as ‘the intent of
tax treaties is to provide benefits to encourage cross-border
investment’ it is not reasonable (for the tax authorities)
‘to deny the benefit of the State R-State S tax convention to
RCO’.
4.3.2.9 Investment by a Securitization Company
55. In Example L,143 a bank, a State T resident,
establishes RCO, a tax resident of State R. RCO acts
as a securitization company. The bank sells its port-
folio of loans and other receivables owed by debtors
located in several jurisdictions to RCO. A majority
of RCOs portfolio (60%) consists of receivables from
State S. RCO receives interest income regularly from
its State S receivables. The treaty benefit that RCO
derives is that the State S domestic withholding tax
on interest is reduced from 30% to 10% under the
R-S tax treaty (the T-S treaty also provides for a
similar rate).
56. The question then arises as to whether the
subject element is satisfied? In this regard, several
aspects need to be considered separately. The first
aspect relates to establishment of RCO in State R. It
is clear that the bank establishes RCO to carry out a
securitization related activity. In this regard, it is
stated that (1) RCO is debt funded (2) RCO’s debt
finance was raised through the issuance of notes that
are widely held by third-party investors (3) the notes
are listed on a recognized stock exchange (4) to
comply with regulatory requirements, the bank has
also retained a small percentage of the listed, widely
held debt securities issued by RCO. The second
aspect relates to the reasons for selecting State R.
The facts indicate that State R was selected because
of several reasons such as (1) State R’s robust secur-
itization framework (2) its securitization and other
relevant legislation (3) the availability of skilled and
experienced personnel and support services in State
R and (4) the existence of tax benefits provided
under State R’s extensive tax convention network.
Furthermore, the facts indicate that investors’ deci-
sions to invest in RCO are not driven by any parti-
cular investment made by RCO and RCO’s
investment strategy is not driven by the tax position
of the investors. RCO is also taxed in State R on
income earned and is entitled to a full deduction for
interest payments made to investors. The third
aspect relates to the activities carried out by the
intermediary in State R. Let’s assume that RCOs
activities are overseen by a competent board of direc-
tors that are comprised of a majority of State R
residents and an experienced local management
team performs the day to day activities (the days to
day activities could also be outsourced but would
continue to be controlled by the directors). In light
of the three aspects it is reasonable to determine that
RCO carries out genuine economic activities that
constitute an active conduct of a business in State
R. The fourth aspect relates to the sale of receivables.
Let’s assume that the sale takes place on an arm’s
length basis.
57. In this situation, it is obvious that RCOs crea-
tion in State R and its purchase of receivables are not
driven with the purposes of avoiding taxes in State S
even though the ‘bank and RCO considered the existence
of a benefit under the State R-State S tax convention with
respect to interest’. Therefore, the subjective element
should not be satisfied. The commentary correctly
reaches this conclusion and states that as ‘the intent of
tax treaties is to provide benefits to encourage cross-border
investment’ it is not reasonable (for the tax authorities)
‘to deny the benefit of the State R-State S tax convention to
RCO’. As the subjective element is not satisfied, the
objective element need not be analysed. In the opi-
nion of the author, the outcome should be similar
even if the T-S treaty provides for a higher rate as
compared to the R-S treaty.144
4.3.2.10 Investment by a Real Estate Investment
Company
58. In Example M,145 a real estate fund, a State C
transparent partnership is established to invest in
real estate across a particular region. A regulated
fund manager manages the fund. The investors in
the fund comprise of institutional investors such as
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and a range of
other investors. The investment strategy of the fund
is based on investing in real estate assets,
Notes
143 2017 OECD, Discussion Draft on Non-CIV Examples, para. 9 (Example 2); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example L.
144 However, the HMRC would not agree with this outcome and challenge the structure by contending that that the securitization vehicle in not the ‘beneficial owner’ of the
interest income. See Examples 1, 2 and 3 discussed in HMRC, Double taxation claims and applications – Beneficial ownership, INTM 332080.
145 2017 OECD, Discussion Draft on Non-CIV Examples, para. 9 (Example 3); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example M.
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maximizing their value and realizing appreciation
through the disposal of the investments. The strat-
egy is not driven by tax considerations. The real
estate fund establishes and invests in RCO, a tax
resident of State R. RCO acts as a holding company.
RCO establishes several wholly owned subsidiaries
in different source States. These subsidiaries purchase
and own the real estate. RCO invests in these sub-
sidiaries through debt and equity. Although it is not
clear as to what the tax treaty benefit is in this
example, it is rational to assume that the tax treaties
between State R and the States of the local subsidiary
companies, restrict the latter States from imposing
their domestic withholding taxes on investment
related income such as dividends, interest and capital
gains.
59. The question then arises as to whether the
subject element is satisfied with respect to the
PPT in the tax treaty between State R and the
other States in which the investment is made? In
this regard, several aspects need to be considered
separately. The first aspect relates to establishment
of RCO in State R. The facts indicate that RCO was
established for several commercial and legal reasons
such as (1) to protect the real estate fund from the
liabilities of and potential claims against the fund’s
immovable property assets (2) to facilitate debt
financing (including from third-party lenders) and
the making, management and disposal of invest-
ments (3) for administering the claims for relief of
withholding tax under any applicable tax treaty. It
is indicated that this is an important function as it
is administratively simpler for one company to get
treaty relief rather than have each institutional
investor process its own claim for relief, especially
if the treaty relief to which each investor would be
entitled as regards a specific item of income is a
small amount. The second aspect relates to the
reasons for selecting State R. The facts indicate
that State R was selected due to its (1) politically
stable environment (2) its regulatory and legal sys-
tem (3) lender and investor familiarity (4) access to
appropriately qualified personnel and (5) the exten-
sive tax convention network of State R, including
its treaties with other States within the specific
geographic area targeted for investment. It is also
stated that RCO does not obtain treaty benefits that
are better than the benefits the investors in the fund
would have received if they had made the same
investments directly in these States. The third
aspect relates to the activities carried out by the
intermediary in State R. Let’s assume that RCOs
activities are 1) overseen by a competent board of
directors that are comprised of a majority of State R
residents; and 2) an experienced local management
team performs the day to day activities (the days to
day activities could also be outsourced but would
continue to be controlled by the directors). The
fourth aspect relates to the investment by RCO in
various States. The facts indicate that RCO makes
several investments in the region in light of the
funds strategy.
60. Given these facts, RCOs creation in State R
and its investment in several source States are ‘made
for commercial purposes consistent with the investment
mandate of the fund’. Moreover, RCO does not derive
any treaty benefits that are better than those to
which its investors would be entitled if they
received the income derived directly from such
investments. Therefore, even though ‘the decision to
locate RCO in State R is taken in light of the existence of
benefits under the tax conventions between State R and the
States within the specific geographic area targeted for
investment’, it is not reasonable (for the tax autho-
rities) to ‘deny the benefit of the tax treaties between
RCO and the States in which RCO’s immovable property
investments are located’. As the subjective element is
not satisfied, the objective element need not be
analysed.
4.3.2.11 Collection of Royalties by a Collective
Management Association
61. Example I146 is indeed a strange example. It
seems to be inspired from a Spanish case that dealt
with royalties received by societies on management
of author’s rights147 or the practise adopted by the
UK tax authorities148 to administer claims made by
overseas collecting societies. The example will be
discussed only from a State R perspective, as the
outcome is similar in the reverse situation. In this
example, several performers and copyright holders
Notes
146 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 14, Example I); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 182, Example I.
147 For a detailed analysis of the judgment see: Jimenez, Beneficial Ownership, at 191–201.
148 See HMRC, Double Taxation applications and claims: Applicants/claimants, INTM 338000.
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from various countries appoint RCO, a tax resident
of State R, as an agent to manage their rights. RCO
has an agreement with SCO, a State S tax resident,
pursuant to which SCO assists RCO to license the
rights to independent users in State S. SCO receives
the royalties and passes them to RCO and then
RCO, net of an agency commission, passes the roy-
alty income to the right holders. SCO has agreed
with the State S tax administration that it will apply
the tax treaty between the State of residence of the
right holder (the beneficial owner) and State S to
determine the withholding tax on royalty payments
that has to be paid to State S. Can the PPT be
applied to this arrangement?
62. In the opinion of the author, this fact pattern
should not be analysed under the PPT rule. The
facts indicate that the relevant treaty that applies
is the treaty between the State of residence of the
right holder and State S. If the treaty is applied in
an accurate manner then logically the PPT should
not be applied. Moreover, this fact pattern does
not contain any element that indicates that a
principal purpose of the arrangement is to obtain
a treaty benefit. This example should, thus, be
deleted as it only demonstrates the correct and
efficient application of tax treaties.
4.4 Other Fact Patterns that Could
Be Subject to the PPT
63. Several other fact patterns discussed in the
commentary, in addition to the nineteen fact pat-
terns discussed in this contribution, could be ana-
lysed with respect to the PPT. For instance, fact
patterns dealing with structures that take advantage
of lower rates for dividends,149 structures that avoid
source taxation on capital gains from sale of shares of
real estate companies150 and structures that avoid
source taxation in triangular cases with PEs151
could be analysed under the PPT. Nevertheless, the
OECD has given States the option to counter abuse
arising from such fact patterns through the adoption
of treaty SAARs that are reflected in Article 8,152
Article 9 153 and Article 10 of the MLI154. Moreover,
other fact patterns that deal with transfer of resi-
dence prior to alienation of assets,155 income re-
characterizations,156 international hiring out of
labour structures,157 rent a star structures158 and
salary splits for director fee remuneration159 could
be analysed under the PPT.
5. THE CONSEQUENCE OF DENYING TREATY
BENEFITS
5.1 The Discretionary Relief Clause
and the Issues Surrounding that Provision
64. Consider the following rule-shopping scheme.
Mr X, a resident of State R, owns a subsidiary viz.,
Corp S (with significant reserves), a resident of State
S. In term of taxes, State S levies a domestic with-
holding tax of 35% on dividends paid by its resi-
dent corporations to non-residents and State R does
not tax capital gains. Further, States R and S have
concluded a tax treaty based on the OECD Model.
If Corp S distributes a dividend then State S will
apply its domestic withholding tax, which can ulti-
mately be reduced under the R-S tax treaty in
accordance with Article 10(2) (15% as it is an
individual taxpayer). To avoid the State S with-
holding tax on dividends, Mr X sells the shares of
Corp S to a related corporation ABC, which is also a
resident of State S, in exchange for a promissory/
loan note. This sale is taxable only in State R
pursuant to Article 13(5) of the R-S tax treaty – even
if State S taxes capital gains derived by non-resi-
dents pursuant to its domestic law. Thereafter,
ABC instructs Corp S to distribute a dividend.
Notes
149 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 10, para. 17; 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 94–95.
150 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 97–99.
151 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 24, para. 71; 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 75–76.
152 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 8.
153 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 9.
154 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 10; 2017 OECD Model (draft), Art. 29(8).
155 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 1, para. 9; 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 41–46.
156 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras. 86–93.
157 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 15, para. 8.1 onwards; 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, para. 81.
158 2014 OECD Comm. Art. 17, para. 11c); 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 82–85.
159 2011 UN Comm. Art. 1, paras 41–46.
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The receipt of dividend by ABC is mostly tax
exempt (pursuant to a domestic dividend exclusion
system for inter-corporate dividends or a domestic
participation exemption regime). Soon afterwards,
ABC uses those proceeds to pay off the promissory/
loan note due to Mr X. Thus, by engaging is such a
transaction, Mr X converts dividend income falling
under Article 10(2)(b) of the R-S tax treaty into a
capital gain falling under Article 13(5). Assume the
PPT applies to this transaction and treaty benefits
(the benefit of exempting capital gains from source
taxation) are not granted. Does this mean that the
item of income will be taxable as per the domestic
law of the source State (35%) or can the taxpayer
still invoke the provisions of Article 10(2) (15%)
and request for treaty relief?
65. If treaty benefits are denied pursuant to the
guiding principle then the author’s view is that
the lower rate of 15% should apply automatically.
However, the OECD’s initial view, in the context
of the PPT, was that the item of income should
then be taxed as per the domestic law of the source
State.160 Nevertheless, in light of the public com-
ments it received pursuant to its follow up work
in November 2014, the final report on Action 6
suggested States to incorporate an alternate treaty
provision which would enable the competent
authorities (tax authorities) to provide discretion-
ary relief.161 The provision, which does not repre-
sent a minimum standard, is also reflected in the
MLI. It states that pursuant to Article 7(3),162 the
Party that chooses to apply the PPT ‘may also
choose’ to apply the discretionary relief rule con-
tained in Article 7(4).163
66. The provision provides that:
Where a benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement is denied to
a person … the competent authority … shall nevertheless treat
that person as being entitled to this benefit, or to different
benefits with respect to a specific item of income or capital, if
such competent authority, upon request from that person and
after consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances,
determines that such benefits would have been granted to
that person in the absence of the transaction or arrangement.
In the absence of the ‘transaction or arrangement’ i.e.
the rule-shopping scheme, Mr X would have been
entitled to a lower rate of 15%. Therefore, if the
provision is incorporated in the R-S tax treaty, the
competent authorities, after a review of the facts
and circumstances, may provide discretionary relief
to Mr X.
67. Interesting issues arise with respect to the
scope of the provision in another rule shopping
situation. Assume that an individual taxpayer, Mr
X (that is entitled to a 15% rate under Article 10
(2)(b)) sells its shares to a related company viz., Co
X (that is entitled to a 5% rate under Article 10
(2)(a)), both residents of State R, prior to a divi-
dend distribution by a company resident in State
S. Assume the PPT applies and the 5% benefit is
denied to Co X. In this situation, can Co X (the
taxpayer who was denied the benefit) invoke the
discretionary relief clause and claim for the appli-
cation of a 15% rate? In the absence of the ‘trans-
action or arrangement’ i.e. the rule-shopping scheme,
Co X would still be entitled to the 5% rate (if it
satisfies the ownership threshold). Therefore, it
does not make sense for Co X to make the
claim. In this circumstance, it is more appropriate
for Mr X to claim for discretionary benefits before
the competent authorities. However, the compe-
tent authorities could deny the application of this
clause to Mr X by arguing that the benefit under
the R-S tax treaty was denied to Co X and not Mr
X. Nevertheless, the commentary answers the
question in the affirmative and states that the
discretionary relief ‘provision would allow the compe-
tent authority of State S to grant the benefit of the
reduced rate provided for in subparagraph b) of para-
graph 2 of Article 10 if that competent authority
determined that such benefit would have been granted
in the absence of the assignment to another company of
the right to receive dividends’.164 Thus, a mismatch
exists between the text and the commentary to the
text.
68. Furthermore, consider the treaty shopping case
discussed in Example C165 to the commentary on
Notes
160 2014 OECD, Follow up work on BEPS Action 6: Preventing Treaty Abuse, at 10–11.
161 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 16); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 184.
162 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(3).
163 2016 OECD, Multilateral Convention, Art. 7(4).
164 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 18); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 186.
165 2015 OECD, Final Report on Treaty Abuse, para. 26 (Commentary in para. 19, Example C); 2017 OECD Comm (Draft), Art. 29, para. 187, Example C.
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anti-conduits (see section 4.2.1). In that example, RCO
is denied the zero rate withholding tax under the R-S
tax treaty. Assume that a tax treaty exists between
State T and State S and that treaty provides for a 10%
withholding tax on interest. Can RCO (the taxpayer
who was denied the benefit) invoke the discretionary
relief clause (in the R-S tax treaty) and claim for the
application of a 10% rate (in the T-S tax treaty)? In
the absence of the ‘transaction or arrangement’ i.e. the
treaty-shopping scheme, RCO would still be entitled
to the zero rate (if its investment represents a genuine
investment). Therefore, it does not make sense for
RCO to make the claim. In this circumstance, it is
more appropriate for TCO to claim for discretionary
benefits before the competent authorities. However,
the competent authorities could deny the application
of this clause to TCO by arguing that the benefit
under the R-S tax treaty was denied to RCO and not
TCO. A drafting flaw emerges in the text of the
provision, as the ‘person’ who is denied the treaty
benefit under the PPT should be the same ‘person’ to
whom discretionary relief can be provided.
69. Based on the foregoing discussion, the author
makes two submissions. Firstly, the references to
the term ‘person’ in Article 7(4) should be deleted
as that reference narrows the scope of applying the
clause.166 Secondly, treaty benefits should be
granted to the taxpayer automatically rather than
subjecting the taxpayer to seek relief under an
administrative mechanism, which could end up
being burdensome.167 Thus, the clause should be
redrafted.168
5.2 Treaties that Do Not Incorporate
the Discretionary Relief Provision
70. Moreover, it should be noted that only a few
countries, which have adopted the PPT, have
opted for the discretionary relief clause.169
Accordingly, another issue arises, with respect to
the foregoing rule shopping or treaty shopping
situations, as to what happens when a tax treaty
does not contain a discretionary relief clause? One
could argue that if the tax treaty does not contain
such a clause then treaty benefits (the benefit of
15% in the rule shopping case and the benefit of
10% in the treaty shopping case) shall not be
granted and hence the domestic withholding tax
rates should apply. This argument should be
rejected. The author submits that Article 7(4)
does not represent a minimum standard.
Accordingly, if this provision is not included in
a tax treaty, it does not mean that treaty benefits
should not be granted, especially if such benefits
are available under domestic law mechanisms.170
With respect to transactions that can be consid-
ered to be abusive within the EU, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ)in the Halifax case has ruled
‘transactions involved in an abusive practice must be
redefined so as to re-establish the situation that would
have prevailed in the absence of the transactions consti-
tuting that abusive practice’.171 Advocate General
Bobek has expressed a similar position in the
recent Cussens case.172 Therefore, the rule shopper
(Mr X) or the treaty shopper (TCO) should be
given access to the lower rates.173
6 KEY CONCLUSIONS
71. With respect to the PPT elements, the
author, firstly, submits that benefits arising to a
taxpayer under the domestic law (direct or indirect
tax related benefits) or another tax treaty or EU Law
will not fall under the scope of this test. Secondly,
the author submits that the subjective element of
the PPT shall be interpreted in a ‘restrictive manner’
in the sense that if the transaction or arrangement
at stake has economic or commercial justifications
Notes
166 Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.6.
167 Lang, PPT rule, at 662.
168 For a possible suggestion see Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.6.
169 See the positions adopted by Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, United Kingdom and Uruguay.
170 For instance, in Switzerland, treaty benefits are granted to re-characterized fact patterns. See Danon, Salome, MLI, s. 3.3.2.4 and s. 3.6. The US also seems to adopt a similar
approach in conduit financing cases wherein the transactions are re-characterized. See US Treasury regulations, 1.881–3 (effect of income tax treaties). The HMRC seems to
adopt a similar position in treaty shopping cases. See Examples 7 and 8 discussed in HMRC, Double taxation claims and applications – Beneficial ownership, INTM 332080.
171 ECJ: Halifax plc and others v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, Case No: C-255/02, 21 Feb. 2006, paras 93–94. Also see ECJ: Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Case No: C-524/04, 13 Mar. 2007, paras 80–83. In that case, the ECJ held that even if abuse arises, UK domestic thin capitalization rules
should not adjust the profits of the borrower beyond that mandated by the arm’s length standard.
172 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, Cussens and others, Case No: C-251/16, 7 Sept. 2017, paras 111–112.
173 See De Broe, EU Law, at 239; Danon & Salome, MLI, s. 3.6.
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other than obtaining a tax advantage, then this
element is not fulfilled. Thirdly, with respect to
the objective element, a two-stage analysis will be
required to ascertain the object and purpose of the
‘relevant provisions’. Under the first stage, the tax-
payer has to determine the object and purpose of
the ‘relevant provisions’ in light of the overall objec-
tives pursued by the tax treaty (legal analysis).
Thereafter, under the second stage, taxpayer will
have to prove that the transaction/arrangement
respects the object and purpose of the ‘relevant
provisions’ at stake (application of the legal analysis
to the facts at stake). Further, the PPT will be has
to be interpreted in light of its legislative intent,
background and the commentary.
72. With respect to the discretionary relief clause in
Article 7(4), the references to the term ‘person’ should be
deleted as that reference narrows the scope of applying
the clause. Secondly, treaty benefits should be granted to
the taxpayer automatically rather than subjecting it to
seek relief under an administrative mechanism, which
could end up being burdensome. Thus the clause should
be redrafted to reflect that “Where a benefit is denied under
the PPT, treaty benefits shall nevertheless be extended to the
situation that would have existed in the absence of the abusive
transaction or arrangement.” This being said, if this provi-
sion is not included in a tax treaty, it does not mean that
treaty benefits should not be granted, especially if such
benefits are available under domestic law mechanisms.
73. On a separate note, interesting issues arise with
respect to the interaction of the PPT with other treaty
anti avoidance rules such as the inherent anti-abuse
rule, existing treaty GAARs and SAARs (the LOB
clause, beneficial ownership clause, holding period pro-
visions introduced in Article 10 and Article 13 of the
2017 Draft OECD Model and so on). Likewise, inter-
esting issues arise with respect to the interaction of the
PPT with other domestic anti-avoidance rules such as
judicial doctrines, statutory GAARs and SAARs (anti-
treaty shopping rules or anti-rule shopping rules).
These issues will be discussed in a subsequent contri-
bution by the author.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERMEDIARY
COMPANIES: MINIMUM SAFEGUARDS
74. The PPT has arrived and it is here to stay.
There is no doubt that its interpretation will create
a lot of uncertainty174 and lead to disputes. In light
of the plethora of disputes that could arise as a result
of applying the PPT, taxpayers (multinational
groups,175 investment funds, financial institutions
and others) that use/deploy intermediary entities
should resort to certain minimum safeguards. The
subjective element of the PPT should not be satisfied
if the transaction or arrangement contains several
non-tax reasons. In light of the foregoing examples
(see section 4), an intermediary entity, at a minimum,
should: (1) outline the commercial reasons for which
it is set up; (2) provide non-tax reasons for being
located in a particular jurisdiction; (3) ensure that a
majority of the entities board of directors comprise of
qualified local tax residents; (4) ensure that the board
meets regularly and plays an active role in overseeing
the activities of intermediary entity; (5) the day-day
‘core’ functions of the entity are carried out by the
board and/or to the extent required by local specialist
staff; (6) ensure that the entities personnel (board
and/or operating staff) ‘control’ and have the ‘financial
capacity’ to bear the risks associated with that entities
investment or activities176; (7) demonstrate that it
has the right to use and enjoy the income it receives
and; (8) the entity owns/leases the necessary equip-
ment and/or office space to carry out its activities.
Specifically, with respect to holding companies, the
personnel clearly demonstrate that they carry out
shareholder related functions177 and take the neces-
sary steps to manage and mitigate ‘shareholder’
related risks. Likewise, for financing companies, the
personnel clearly demonstrate that they carry out
financing related functions178 and take the necessary
steps to manage and mitigate ‘financial’ related
risks.179 Similarly for intellectual property entities,
the personnel clearly demonstrate that they carry out
development, enhancement, maintenance, protection
and exploitation (DEMPE) related functions (till the
extent relevant) and take the necessary steps to
Notes
174 OECD/IMF, Tax Certainty, at 45–46.
175 Intermediary structures employed by large multinationals will be transparent pursuant to revised transfer pricing documentation requirements, i.e. country-by-country
reporting.
176 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, paras 1.56–1.70.
177 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para. 7.4 and paras 7.9–7.10.
178 Such as loan creation and loan management activities. See Chand, Loans, at 896–898.
179 Such as credit, interest rate and foreign exchange risks. See Chand, Loans, at 896–898.
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manage and mitigate the associated risks.180
Appropriate documentation to demonstrate the fore-
going needs to be maintained on a robust basis. This
being said, whether or not the PPT applies would
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